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INTRODUCTION
The field of transitional justice has expanded beyond dealing with
accountability, truth, victims' redress, and a number of related issues in
the context of democratization processes. It now addresses a much
wider variety of cases where the international community, states, local
communities, or other actors implement various measures to confront
(sometimes still ongoing) human rights abuses and other forms of
injustices. 1 While early transitional justice scholarship focused
primarily on the judicial and quasi-judicial processes launched to deal
with massive human rights abuses following a fundamental political
transition,2 scholars now increasingly seem to expect that transitional
justice mechanisms will bring about transformation-political or
otherwise.3 Yet, it is often unclear what purposes transitional justice
1. See, e.g., Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinary and the State
of the 'Field' or 'Non-Field', 3 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 5 (2009) (discussing
development in the field of transitional justice).
2. See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
3. See, e.g., Fionnuala N. Aoldin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of
Transition in Conflicted Democracies, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 172 (2005) (arguing that
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol42/iss1/2
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KENYA?
serves, how the use of these mechanisms impacts the prospects of
transition, and which stakeholders promote or discourage the
establishment of transitional justice processes.' Using the Kenyan
government's reaction to the 2008 post-election violence as a case
study, this article examines some important aspects of transitional
justice in Kenya. More specifically, the article identifies and discusses
the drivers and obstacles to accountability for the post-election violence
as well as the question of how the use of accountability measures may
impact the prospects of a meaningful transition in the country.
In Kenya, the process of establishing a political settlement to the
disputed 2007 general elections was combined with efforts to create a
number of mechanisms aimed at addressing the country's legacy of
political violence.5  Though these accountability, truth-seeking, and
reform measures have generally been conceptualized within a
transitional justice paradigm,6 arguably there has been no fundamental
(political or otherwise) transition in the country, and it is disputed
whether such a transition is likely to take place in the near future.7
Little is known of how the absence of a fundamental political transition
justice tools used in contexts where there has not been a fundamental political
transition should be conceptualized as transitional justice since they have potential
to bring about a stable and peaceful democracy).
4. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated
Theory, 13 OR. REV. INT'L L. 1 (2011) available at http://www.law.uoregon.edu/
org/oril/docs/13-1/Hansen.pdf (discussing various scenarios in which transitional
justice mechanisms may be utilized, and the different interests these mechanisms can
serve).
5. Thomas Obel Hansen, Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes,
Responses, and a Framework for Discussing Preventive Action, INST. FOR SECURITY
STUD. PAPER 205 (Nov. 2009) available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/
p205.pdf
6. Evelyne Asaala, Exploring Transitional Justice as a Vehicle for Social and
Political Transformation in Kenya, 10 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 377, 382 (2010)
available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlj/ahrlj vol10
_no2_2010.pdf. See also Godfrey M. Musila, Options for Transitional Justice in
Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External Prescriptions, 3 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 445 (2009).
7. See Osogo Ambani, Conditions are Hardly Right for Transitional Justice,
DAILY NATION, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion//440808/
638224/-/4mmd2w/-/index.html (arguing that "Kenya is not experiencing a
transition"). But see Asaala, supra note 6, at 385 (concluding that "Kenya remains a
state in transition").
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has affected the pursuit of transitional justice in Kenya.8 Furthermore,
there has only been limited engagement with the question of how the
various transitional justice measures in the country impact the political
landscape and the possibility of a transition9 - here understood to
concern political change as well as peaceful transformation.
Focusing on accountability measures, this article sets out to explore
these gaps in the literature. First, this article analyzes how the absence
of fundamental transition has impacted the pursuit of accountability for
the 2008 post-election violence. Second, this article explores how the
accountability process impacts domestic politics and security.
I. BACKGROUND TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KENYA
Contrary to mainstream perceptions, large-scale political violence
in Kenya is not exclusively related to the disputed 2007 elections, but
has unfolded on a number of other occasions,' 0 particularly in the
context of elections. Since the establishment of a multi-party system
in 1992, elections in Kenya have tended to be surrounded by clashes
between the supporters of different political parties, sometimes at a
level comparable to the 2008 violence. In 1992, for example, Human
Rights Watch estimates that electoral violence claimed the lives of
approximately 1,500 people and displaced approximately 300,000."
Five years later, the 1997 elections were similarly followed by large-
scale violence, especially in the Coast Province and in the Rift
8. But see Musila, supra note 6 (discussing how various stakeholders approach
the transitional justice debate in Kenya).
9. But see Christine Alai & Njonjo Mue, Briefing Paper, Kenya: Impact of the
Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, INT'L CENTER FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2010) [hereinafter Impact of the Rome Statute], available at
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-ICC-Impact-2010-English.pdf; Thomas
Obel Hansen, How Will International Criminal Court Prosecutions Impact Kenya's
Legacy of Political Violence?, TOwARD FREEDOM, AFRICA (Apr. 12, 2011, 11:23
PM), http://www.towardfreedom.com/africa/2359-how-will-international-criminal-
court-prosecutions-impact-on-kenyas-legacy-of-political-violence.
10. Madeline Bunting, Comment, The Violence in Kenya May be Awful, But it
is Not Senseless 'Savagery,' GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2008/jan/14/kenya.world.
11. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING WITH FIRE: WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN KENYA 20 (2002),
available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/kenya/Kenya0502.pdf.
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Valley. 12 Though far more peaceful than the two previous elections,
some violent incidents also took place in connection with the 2002
elections. 13
In 2007, the trend of violence persisted. Following a disputed
presidential election in December 2007, where both incumbent
president Mwai Kibaki (PNU political party) and his challenger Raila
Odinga (ODM political party) claimed victory, large-scale violence
erupted in various parts of Kenya, in particular the Rift Valley and
Nairobi slums.14  During the course of a few weeks, more than a
thousand Kenyans died in clashes between supporters of Kibaki and
Odinga." The violence was driven by armed youth groups and the
Mungiki criminal gang, but the police were also involved in the
attacks, responsible for perhaps approximately one-third of the total
casualties.*16
Under the auspices of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities,
headed by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an
internationally-sponsored mediation process known as the "Kenyan
National Dialogue and Reconciliation" (KNDR) enabled a settlement
to the dispute.' 7 This entailed the creation of a coalition government
in which Kibaki remained president and Odinga became prime
12. Id. at 21.
13. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND KENYA'S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 6 (2008) [hereinafter
BALLOTS TO BULLETS], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/kenya0308web.pdf.
14. See generally COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE POST ELECTION
VIOLENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST ELECTION
VIOLENCE, (2008) [hereinafter CIPEV], available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/
docs/PEV%20Report.pdf; BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 13; Hansen, Political
Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, and a Framework for Discussing
Preventive Action, supra note 5.
15. CIPEV, supra note 14, at 305.
16. Id. at 384-85.
17. See KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, THE NATIONAL
ACCORD AND RECONCILIATION ACT (2008), available at
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/SignedNational-AccordActFeb28.pdf;
Interview by Martin Griffiths with Kofi A. Annan, 7th Secretary-General of the
United Nations, in Geneva, Switz. (May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Kofi A. Annan
Interview], available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWD
ocUnidFilename/JBRN-7QMD4C-fullreport.pdf/$File/full report.pdf (discussing
the process of negotiating this settlement).
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minister." Under pressure from the international community and
Kenyan civil society, the two parties to the dispute publically stated
their commitment to establishing a number of mechanisms aimed at
addressing Kenya's legacy of political violence, including criminal
prosecutions; a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
(TJRC); a constitutional review process; and other measures. 19
While debates about transitional justice have taken place on a
number of occasions in Kenya's history,20 the current discussions
about accountability, truth-seeking, and a number of related issues
tend to be specifically linked to the violence in 2008.21 Nonetheless,
some of the measures established, including the TJRC, are intended to
address political violence and other injustices in a comprehensive
manner, covering the entire post-colonial period.22 As argued in this
18. Kofi A. Annan Interview, supra note 17.
19. See KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, ANNOTATED
AGENDA AND TIMETABLE (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter KNDR ANNOTATED AGENDA],
available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/SignedAnnotated Agenda
Feb 1 st.pdf; KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON LONG-TERM ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS (May 23, 2008), available at
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/Sof P with Matrix.pdf. Kenyan NATIONAL
DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, AGENDA ITEM 3: How TO SOLVE THE POLITICAL
CRISIS (Feb. 14, 2008) [hereinafter KNDR AGENDA ITEM], available at
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/14_Feb_08_TsavoAgreement.pdf. For an
analysis of the debate and establishment of these various processes, see Hansen,
Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses, and a Framework for
Discussing Preventive Action, supra note 5.
20. See, e.g., Wanza Kioko, The Place of Transitional Justice in Kenya's
Impending Political Transition, in BUILDING AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSITION IN KENYA 306 (Lawrence M. Mute, Kichamu Akivaga & Wanza Kioko
eds., 2002).
21. Musila, supra note 6.
22. For an account of the TJRC, see Asaala, supra note 6, at 395-404. In
addition to electoral violence, the various post-independence governments have, to
different extents, been responsible for gross human rights violations. Under Jomo
Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi's (1978-2002) regimes, political opponents
and other critics of the incumbent frequently suffered arbitrary detention, torture,
and in some cases, extrajudicial killings. See Susanne D. Mueller, The Political
Economy of Kenya's Crisis, 2 J. E. AFR. STUD. 185. Although the human rights
record of the current coalition government has significantly improved-especially
compared to Moi's dictatorship-extrajudicial killings by police continue to occur,
especially in the context of organized crime. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND
RULE STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KENYA 6-10 (1993), available at
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article, other measures, such as the accountability process, may also
address some of the factors that have allowed political violence to
unfold in the country on a regular basis.
II. SHAPING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS: POLITICAL
OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KENYA'S
POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE
A. The Initial Debate Concerning a Local or International
Accountability Process
From its inception, the debate about accountability for the 2008
election violence has been framed around a perceived dichotomy
between local and international forums for justice. However, as this
article suggests, rather than taking the form of a principled discussion
about the most appropriate forum for a legitimate accountability
process, members of Kenya's political elite have tended to support
different forums for an accountability process based on other
considerations, including the prospects of compromising justice or
gaining personal advantage by seeing political opponents targeted.
The debate over local or international justice was triggered by the
publication of a report by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-
Election Violence (CIPEV), which the parties to the election dispute
created to investigate the violence and make recommendations on how
to address it. 23 In the October 2008 publication, CIPEV recommended
the establishment of a local accountability process (a so-called Special
Tribunal) composed of Kenyans and foreigners to prosecute those
responsible for organizing the 2008 post-election violence. 24 CIPEV
made the proposal under the threat that, if the government failed to
immediately comply with the recommendations, it would forward "a
list containing names of and relevant information on those suspected
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenyal193.pdf. See also U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Promotion and
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, On His Mission to
Kenya, 5, 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 1/2/Add.6 (May 26, 2009).
23. See CIPEV, supra note 14.
24. Id. at 472-75.
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to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the proposed Special Tribunal" to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor.25
Before the CIPEV report went public, the parties to the KNDR
had already stated their commitment to criminal prosecutions of those
responsible for the post-election violence.26 However, it soon became
clear that it would be difficult to obtain the necessary political
commitment for establishing local accountability measures. On
February 12, 2009, for example, the Kenyan parliament voted down a
bill concerning the establishment of a special tribunal to deal with the
post-election violence. 2 7
Many of the members of parliament who opposed this opportunity
to establish a local accountability process cited problems with judicial
independence in Kenya and emphasized their preference to conduct
the trials in The Hague. For example, following the defeat of the
February bill, William Ruto argued, "Kofi Annan should hand over
the envelope that contains names of suspects to the International
Criminal Court at The Hague so that proper investigations can start." 28
This response might seem ironic because Ruto was later named as one
of the ICC suspects, in connection to which he unsurprisingly became
25. CIPEV required the coalition partners to make and sign an agreement to
establish a special tribunal within sixty days after presenting the report to the Panel
of Eminent African Personalities. See id. at 473. As Musila points out, this
provision in the report seems to be based on a misunderstanding about the
circumstances under which the ICC's jurisdiction is triggered. Musila, supra note 6,
at 457.
26. See KNDR ANNOTATED AGENDA, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining that the
parties agreed to conduct further discussions on how to ensure "the impartial,
effective and expeditious investigation of gross and systematic violations of human
rights and that those found guilty are brought to justice"); KNDR AGENDA ITEM,
supra note 19, § III (indicating that the parties recognized the need for a political
settlement to promote national reconciliation and unity, which in turn requires
"identification and prosecution of perpetrators of violence").
27. Further, on July 14, 2009, the cabinet rejected a bill on special tribunals;
on July 30, 2009, parliament rejected a special tribunal bill; and on November 14,
2009, there was no quorum for debating the special tribunal bill. See KENYA
NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION MONITORING PROJECT, DRAFT REVIEW
REPORT 23 (Apr. 2011), [hereinafter KNDR DRAFT REVIEW], available at
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/April2011KNDRReport.pdf.
28. See Ruto: Why I Prefer The Hague Route, DAILY NATION (Feb. 21, 2009),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1 056/533390/-/u2h24m/-/index.html.
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strongly opposed to The Hague option. 29 On the other hand, Odinga,
who was initially in favor of the local option, became a strong
supporter for ICC trials once the suspects-some of whom are in
political opposition to Odinga-were named. 30 The fact that Ruto,
Odinga, and many others have continuously reversed their stance on
where to conduct trials illustrates, as Musila notes, how "[p]olitical
elites, in particular those reported to be on the list of accused prepared
by the Waki Commission, have vacillated between the various
options, unsure which would safeguard their own agendas: trials in
The Hague or local trials; trials before the Special Tribunal or national
courts; and/or the TJRC."31
B. Political Elites' Reactions to the Naming ofICC Suspects
In July 2009, Kofi Annan, who had been provided with a list of
key suspects in the election violence by CIPEV, lost his patience with
the Kenyan leadership and forwarded the list to the ICC Prosecutor.3 2
On March 31, 2010, amidst continued debate in Kenya about
establishing a special tribunal, using the ordinary court system to
prosecute the masterminds of the post-election violence, or relying on
the TJRC,33 Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC authorized the
Prosecutor to commence an investigation into the Kenyan case.34
29. See Benjamin Muindi, ICC: Uhuru, Ruto Lash Out at PM, DAILY NATION
(Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1133610/-/7q7klt/-
/index.html. At one point (August 2009), Ruto seemed to favour using the TJRC to
deal with the organizers and perpetrators of Kenya's post-election violence. See
Maureen Mudi and Karanja Njoroge, Ruto Urges Clergy to Back Reconciliation,
STANDARD (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/archives/sports/
InsidePage.php?id= 144020630&cid=4.
30. See Ruto: Why I Prefer the Hague Route, supra note 28.
31. See Musila, supra note 6, at 450. The Waki Commission is the unofficial
name for CIPEV.
32. See Hansen, Political Violence in Kenya: A Study of Causes, Responses,
and a Framework for Discussing Preventive Action, supra note 5, at 9.
33. See Impact of the Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 2-3 (discussing the
various attempts of establishing a local accountability mechanism).
34. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 83 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf.
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On December 15, 2010, less than a year after the Pre-Trial
Chamber granted the prosecutor permission to open an investigation
into Kenya's post-election violence, Ocampo submitted applications
requesting the Court to summon the six individuals he deemed to bear
the greatest responsibility for the violence. Among the suspects are
Francis Muthaura, the top civil servant in the country, as well as Ruto
and Uhuru Kenyatta, who have both announced their candidacy for
the 2012 presidential elections.
Though most Kenyan leaders, including President Kibaki, have
continuously stated their commitment to cooperate with the ICC," the
government's actual level of cooperation has often been half-
hearted.37 Indeed, after Ocampo named the suspects in December
2010, Kenyan leaders have made a series of moves aimed at halting
the ICC process.
i. Motion Requiring Withdrawalfrom the Rome Statute.,
On December 22, 2010, almost immediately following Ocampo's
request to have the summonses issued, the Kenyan parliament passed
a motion requiring the Kenyan government to take "appropriate action
35. See Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Public Redacted Version of
Document ICC-01/09-30-Conf-Exp, Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1050835.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as
to Ruto, Kosgey and Sang]; Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali,
Public Redacted Version of Document ICC-01/09-31-Conf-Exp, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050845.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor's
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali].
36. See Impact of the Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 3-4; KNDR DRAFT
REVIEW, supra note 27, at 23-24. For a recent statement confirming the
government's commitment to the ICC process, see OFFICE OF PUBLIC
COMMUNICATIONS (OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT SPOKESPERSON), GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE TO MEDIA STATEMENT BY ICC PROSECUTOR LuIs MORENO OCAMPO
(2011), http://www.communication.go.ke/media.asp?id=1278 (noting "[t]he
government wishes to inform the world that we understand, appreciate and respect
the Rome Statute, the Rights enshrined by the United Nations and the ICC
process.").
37. See, e.g., KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at 23-24.
10
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to withdraw from the Rome Statute." 3 8  The motion, which was
opposed by only one member of parliament (former Justice Minister
and presidential candidate for the 2012 elections, Martha Karua), was
passed under threat that any failure to comply with its contents within
sixty days would lead to actions against the Kibaki administration,
including sabotaging government business in the Parliament. 3 9 Noting
that "any criminal investigations or prosecutions arising out of the
post election violence of 2007/2008 be undertaken under the
framework of the new Constitution," the motion not only rejected ICC
intervention, but once again brought attention back to the possibility
of establishing a local accountability process.40
Although some cabinet members initially appeared in favor of the
motion, the government ultimately chose not to take any action on it.41
Rather than reflecting the government's commitment, to the ICC
process, this neglect of parliament's decision seems to be based on
(the correct) understanding that a possible withdrawal from the Rome
Statute would not affect the country's obligation to cooperate with the
ICC concerning the two pending cases.42 This interpretation is
38. Motion 144 in KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, Motions 2010 (Dec. 22,
2010), available at http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=comdocman&
task=doc download&gid=636&Itemid=.
39. See id. (implying that action will be taken against the government if it fails
to comply); Amnesty Int'l, Kenya: Denouncing the Rome Statute Shall Not Have
Any Effect on Investigations Currently Under Course, Al Index AFR 32/019/2010
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR32/019/
2010/en/bdeb0dac-6e55-4496-b4ad-f67201c5caf8/afr320192010en.pdf.
40. See Motion 144 in KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 38.
41. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Why the Ocampo Six Should Not Become
Kenya's Six, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.opendemocracy.net/
thomas-obel-hansen/why-ocampo-six-should-not-become-kenya%E2%80%99s-six
(noting that Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi, Minister for Public Health and
Sanitation Beth Mugo, and Minister for Nairobi Metropolitan Development Njeru
Githae called for a withdrawal in early January 2011).
42. According to Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, a withdrawal takes effect
"one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies
a later date." Article 127(2) further stipulates that,
[a] State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the
obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute,
including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection
with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the
2011] I I
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supported by the fact that the government instead launched a number
of other initiatives to end ICC involvement in Kenya.
ii. Efforts to Obtain a Deferral
One such way of challenging the ICC process concerns the
government's efforts to obtain a U.N. Security Council deferral of the
Kenyan cases under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, according to
which the Council can order a temporary-but possibly renewed-
stop to ICC investigations or prosecutions if it deems that such action
threatens international peace and security.4 3
Spearheaded by Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, in early 2011,
the Kenyan government launched diplomatic efforts aimed at
convincing other countries that the Security Council should defer the
case.44 As an initial outcome of this diplomacy, in late January 2011,
the African Union decided to support Kenya's quest for putting a
temporary stop to the ICC cases. 45  Though this support from the
African Union should be understood in light of how the regional body
increasingly views ICC involvement on the continent as a threat to the
sovereignty of African states, it also reveals that the Kenyan
government used considerable resources to foster and mobilize
support from other countries to halt the accountability process. 46
withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it
prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
43. Article 16 of the Rome Statute states: "No investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months
after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be
renewed by the Council under the same conditions." Id.
44. See, e.g., Njeri Rugene, Kalonzo Defends Shuttle Over ICC Trials, DAILY
NATION (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/l 103784/-
/7ocyvn/-/index.html.
45. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Implementation of
the Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII), A.U.
Doc. Assembly/AU/16 T 6 (Jan. 30-31, 2011).
46. See, e.g., Kalonzo's Trips Cost Taxpayers Sh4 Million, KENTV, available
at http://www.kentv.net/home/kentv-news/1-latest-news/3272-kalonzos-trips-cost-
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Having obtained this regional support, on February 8, 2011, the
Kenyan government made a formal request to the U.N. Security
Council for a deferral.47 in support of the request, government
officials stated that because "some of the individuals mentioned by the
ICC prosecutor are among the front runner presidential candidates and
the civil servants mentioned are in office and charged with
responsibilities for peace and security," the ICC process poses "a real
and present danger to the exercise of government and the management
of peace and security in the country." 48
As it became increasingly clear that it would prove difficult to
convince U.N. Security Council members that the ICC process poses a
threat to the country's security and should therefore be deferred, the
government instead deployed another strategy aimed at ending ICC
action in the country.49
iii. Application Challenging Admissibility
On March 31, 2011, two British lawyers (Sir Geoffrey Nice and
Rodney Dixon) hired by the Kenyan government filed an application
with the ICC challenging the admissibility of the cases pursuant to
Article 19 of the Rome Statute, which states (with reference to Article
17 of the Statute) that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction if a state
taxpayer-sh4-million (noting that the Vice President spent around 4 million Kenyan
shillings visiting heads of states and ministers in Nigeria, Libya, Malawi, Ethiopia,
South Africa, and Uganda lobbying for support for the deferral).
47. See, e.g., Kenya Petitions UN Organ to Delay Trials, DAILY NATION (Feb.
10, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenya%20petitions%20UN%
20organ%20to%20delay%20trials%20/-/1064/1105328/-/dtt3w0z/-/index.html.
48. See Letter from Macharia Kamau, Kenya's Permanent Representative to
the U.N. in New York, to the President of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome
Statute (Feb. 28, 2011), [hereinafter Kamau Letter], available at
http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/news/general/81922-Kenyas-letter-ICC-President.
html.
49. See, e.g., Kevin Kelley, Kenya ICC Deferral Bid Fails, DAILY NATION
(Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/UN+Council+rejects+
Kenya+ICC+deferral+bid/-/1064/1141408/-/qmartOz/-/index.html (describing that
on April 8, 2011 (after the US, the UK, and other permanent members of the
Council had continuously stated their opposition to a deferral), the President of the
U.N. Security Council declared that, "after full consideration," the members of
Council could not agree to support Kenya's request for deferral and no further action
would be taken on the matter for the time being).
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with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case. 0  The
admissibility challenge points to "the fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional and judicial reforms very recently enacted in Kenya."5 '
Based on these reforms, it is argued that the "[n]ational courts will
now be capable of trying crimes from the post-election violence,
including the ICC cases, without the need for legislation to create a
special tribunal, thus overcoming a hurdle previously a major
stumbling block." 52
Despite the government's attempts to convince the ICC judges
that domestic investigations had commenced or were under way,53 on
May 30, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected the admissibility
challenge, stating that no credible information had been provided to
show that Kenya was in fact investigating the Ocampo Six. 54
Dissatisfied with this ruling, the government filed an appeal, which
50. See Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua
Arap Sang and Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and
Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/l 1,
Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to
Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050005.pdf.
51. Id. 2.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Bernard Namunane, Wako Orders Police to Probe the Ocampo
Six, DAILY NATION (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/
Wako+orders+police+to+probe+the+Ocampo+Six+/-/1064/1151428/-/jklOym/-
/index.html (discussing that Attorney-General Amos Wako, seemingly in an attempt
to promote the admissibility challenge, ordered the police commissioner to include
the Ocampo Six in investigations of the post-election violence alleged to take place
in Kenya).
54. See Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and
Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-0l1/11, Decision on the Application by the
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article
19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/docl078822.pdf, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/1 1, Decision on the
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf
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the ICC Appeals Chamber subsequently rejected as it found there
were no ongoing investigations in Kenya.55
C. Understanding the Government's Accountability Policies
When analyzed in conjunction, it seems clear that the main
purpose of government's action has been to avoid criminal
prosecutions of the six suspects (and other masterminds of the post-
election violence) altogether. On the one hand, the government has
sought a deferral of the ICC cases, claiming that prosecuting the
Ocampo Six will jeopardize peace and stability in the country. But,
on the other hand, the government has attempted to challenge the
admissibility of the ICC cases, arguing that a domestic accountability
process involving the six ICC suspects has commenced. Various
statements made by government officials support this interpretation.
For example, Vice President Musyoka has noted, "[y]ou [Ruto and
Kenyatta] should not lose hope because of being named in the ICC
list. The Government will do its best to assist you, because we want
to ensure that every Kenyan feels part and parcel of the next
dispensation." 56
The leadership's reluctance to ensure accountability for the post-
election violence, which stands in stark contrast to ordinary Kenyans'
support for ICC involvement in Kenya,57 may not be surprising given
that some of the Ocampo Six are still involved at the highest levels of
government business. For example, despite being named as ICC
suspects, Kenyatta continues to serve as Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Finance, and Muthaura continues to serve as the top Civil
55. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua
Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Application by the
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article
19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), supra note 54; Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging
the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30,
2011), supra note 54.
56. Raila Rivals Toy with Single Candidate Plan, DAILY NATION (Jan. 16,
2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+rivals+toy+with+single+
candidate+plan++/-/l 064/1090904/-/13rakrr/-/index.html.
57. See KNDR DRAFT REvIEw, supra note 27, at 9 (finding that 78% of
Kenyans are "very/somewhat happy" about ICC involvement in Kenya).
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Servant and Secretary to the Cabinet. Consequently, as noted by the
ICC prosecutor, "currently the suspects or their allies are able to
influence the Kenyan government's position."58
Thus, while Kenyan leaders initiated discussions about
accountability, the absence of a political transition in Kenya has
proved an obstacle to obtaining sufficient support for establishing
accountability measures at the domestic level. This political context
has also caused crucial elements in the leadership to fiercely resist the
ICC process, which is nonetheless still ongoing. Yet, as discussed in
the following section, government action to combat the ICC is not
based on consensus in the Kenyan leadership. This lack of consensus
has to do with a complex relationship between the accountability
process and domestic politics.
III. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS'S IMPACT ON
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND SECURITY
Perhaps more than any other country where the ICC is involved,
Kenya's political landscape has been deeply influenced by the Court's
action. Especially following Ocampo's naming of the six suspects in
December 2010, the ICC process has contributed to a number of
significant developments in the political landscape, some of which
have implications for peace and security in the country.
A. Split in the Coalition Government and ODMPolitical Party
Since early 2011, tensions between the two coalition partners have
escalated, something which on the surface seems a consequence of
conflicting perceptions concerning whether the ICC process should be
supported. Whereas Kibaki's PNU party, which has dominated the
official government responses, is opposed to the proceedings, decisive
58. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua
Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Prosecution's Response to "Request for
Assistance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to
Article 93(10) and Rule 194" 8 (May 10, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc 1070344.pdf.
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parts of the ODM political party, including Prime Minister Odinga,
support ICC trials. 9
The lack of a coherent government policy is evident from a
number of incidents. On March 13, 2011, for example, ODM
Secretary General Anyang' Nyong'o wrote a letter on behalf of the
ODM political party, urging the U.N. Security Council not to order a
deferral of the ICC cases, thereby distancing himself from the
diplomacy launched by Vice President Musyoka.60 Further, in sharp
contrast to the efforts made by the government to end ICC
involvement, Odinga has expressed his support for trying the Ocampo
Six in The Hague on a number of occasions. 61
However, though it is fair to conclude that the ICC issue has been
the dominating controversy between the coalition partners since
Ocampo named the six suspects in December 2010, it is important to
note that the coalition government has a track record of failing to
agree on other major national issues. 62 Even if the ICC controversy
has intensified tensions between the two coalition partners, it should
therefore not be viewed as something which has caused a breakdown
of an otherwise harmonious government. 63
59. See, e.g., Dave Opiyo, Kenya Coalition Partners Lock Horns Over Cases,
DAILY NATION (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Coalition
+partners+lock+homs+over+cases+/-/1064/1122832/-/970bg9/-/index.html.
60. See Peter Leftie, Reject Kenya Plea, Orange Asks UN, DAILY NATION
(Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Orange+asks+UN+to
+reject+ Kenya+plea+/-/1064/1124530/-/v7vewrz/-/index.html.
61. See, e.g., Njeri Rugene, Prove your Innocence at Hague, Ocampo Six
Told, DAILY NATION (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/
PM+says+local+trials+require+independent+bodies/-/1064/1131542/-/aryd4lz/-
/index.html (quoting Prime Minister Odinga as saying, "[t]hat innocence of the six
must be proved through a fair judicial process. If you are mentioned, go through the
process," and "[i]f you are a suspect do not tell us you are innocent. Go and clear
your name there (at the Hague)").
62. Kenya: Who is in Charge Here, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, May 1, 2009, at 10.
63. This conclusion is also supported by ordinary Kenyans. A recent survey
finds that only nine percent of Kenyans who believe it is hard for the coalition
partners to work together view the ICC process as the major reason for this (while
48% mention "lack of cohesion in the government," 32% mention "political party
divisions," and 11% mention "2012 elections competition"). See KNDR DRAFT
REVIEW, supra note 27, at 45.
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While there is a split between the coalition partners, there are also
internal tensions within the ODM political party. Such internal
tensions were demonstrated in mid-March 2011, when a number of
ODM leaders-including Vice Chair Aden Bare Duale, Deputy
Organizing Secretary Benjamin Langat, and Deputy Secretary General
Mohamed Mohamud-sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council,
explaining that the letter sent by ODM Secretary General Nyong'o did
not reflect the ODM party's position on the deferral issue.64 Adding
further confusion to the ODM policy, in late March 2011, both
Nyong'o and Odinga seemed to temporarily change their position
when they stated their support for the establishment of a credible local
accountability process. 65  Odinga, however, soon reaffirmed his
support for trials in The Hague. 66
Furthermore, there was clear disagreement in the party when it
discussed whether the party should provide the ODM suspects with
legal assistance. On March 24, 2011, Parliamentary Secretary Ababu
Namwamba and other ODM leaders stated that all three suspects in
the ODM case would be accompanied by lawyers paid by the party
during their initial appearances in The Hague. 67 However, Nyong'o
later contradicted this statement when he denied claims that the party
would provide legal aid to any of the ODM suspects. 68 The confusion
was complete when Ruto subsequently made clear that he was not
even interested in obtaining such assistance, noting that it would
resemble "a hyena promising defence to goats." 69  These tensions
64. See Ruto Allies Write to UN Council on Hague Trials, DAILY NATION
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Ruto+allies+write+to+UN
+council+on+Hague+trials+/-/1064/1127568/-/9yrarqz/-/index.html.
65. See Patrick Mayoyo, ODM Pushes for ICC-Led Local Trials, DAILY
NATION (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ODM+pushes+for
+ICC+1ed+local+trials+/-/1064/1131848/-/1282cOj/-/index.html.
66. See Dave Opiyo, Clear the Air on Trials, ODM Told, DAILY NATION (Mar.
25, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1 064/1132864/-/7q6x04/-
/index.html.
67. See John Ngirachu & Njeri Rugene, ODM to Hire Lawyers for Ruto,
Kosgey Over ICC Cases, DAILY NATION (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1 064/1132406/-/7q6tp l/-/index.html.
68. See Njeri Rugene, ODM Confusion Over Legal Aid for ICC Suspects,
DAILY NATION (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Confusion+
over+1awyers+hiring//1 064/1132746/-/rn3ksuz/-/index.html.
69. See Muindi, supra note 29.
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between the coalition partners and within the ODM party are closely
related to succession politics.
The two front figures of the ODM party, Odinga and Ruto, as well
as Kenyatta, have all announced their candidacy for the 2012
presidential election. Ruto, Kenyatta, and their supporters claim that
Prime Minister Odinga is using the ICC process to get rid of his
competitors for the 2012 presidential elections, suggesting that the
prime minister had influenced the ICC prosecutor's decision to target
Ruto and Kenyatta. 70  Though Odinga has firmly dismissed such
allegations,n it seems true that the ICC process comes convenient for
the Prime Minister, who has never agreed on much with Ruto and
started to see Ruto and Kenyatta threaten his path to the State House
in 2012.72 Moreover, Odinga's media appearances arguably indicate
that he is using the ICC process to promote his own presidential
aspirations. For example, a few hours before the suspects took off to
The Hague in connection with the April 2011 hearings, the Prime
Minister went on national television to express his sympathy with the
victims of the post-election violence.73
In sum, ICC intervention has escalated the divides in political
leadership. Yet, rather than viewing the ICC process as the cause of
tensions in Kenyan politics, it is more correct to view it as something
which has added fuel to existing tensions and is being used as a tool to
fight competitors for the 2012 presidential elections.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Anthony Kariuki, Raila Insists on ICC Trial for Ocampo Six,
DAILY NATION (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+
insists+on+ICC+trial+for+Ocampo+Six+/-/1064/1133462/-/yduvkoz/-/index.html.
72. See, e.g., Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, NAIROBI CHRONICLE
(Aug. 17, 2009), http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2009/08/17/%EFBB%
BFraila-ruto-clash-not-surprising-at-all/ (discussing a clash between Ruto and
Odinga in 2009, which it is argued, follows a pattern that results from the two
politicians' opposed views on major issues).
73. See Kenyatta-Odinga Rivalry Replayed, DAILY NATION (Apr. 9, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenyatta+Odinga+rivalry+replayed+/-
/1064/1141866/-/irxpwsz/-/index.html.
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B. New Coalitions and Various Scenarios for the 2012 Elections
i. New Coalitions
Following Ocampo's naming of the ICC suspects, Ruto and
Kenyatta formed an alliance, which also includes Vice President
Musyoka and a number of other prominent politicians. 74  The
formation of such a coalition, which has the stated purpose of
obtaining power in the 2012 elections,75 might seem ironic given that
Ruto and Kenyatta are alleged to have incited violent attacks on each
other's supporters in connection to the 2008 elections. 76 An obvious
interpretation, therefore, is that the coalition is a "marriage of
convenience" formed by the two suspects in order to influence
government policies on the ICC issue, and to challenge Odinga's way
to State House next year by creating an opposition which may draw on
the support of the members of some of the major tribes in Kenya (the
Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, and the Kamba).77 However, whereas the ICC
process has clearly influenced when this coalition was formed and
seems to have strengthened the ties between Ruto and Kenyatta, it is
not impossible that even in the absence of The Hague Court's
involvement in Kenya, Kenyatta and Ruto would have joined forces at
some point prior to the 2012 elections, as forming such an alliance
74. Besides Vice President Musyoka, the alliance appears to include George
Saitoti (Rift Valley), Abdikadir Mohamed (North Eastern), Najib Balala (Coast),
and Eugene Wamalwa (Western). See Murithi Mutiga, Hague Cases Set to Change
the 2012 Election Game Plan, DAILY NATION (Apr. 9, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/A+race+against+time+/-/1064/1141852/-
/2ifwihz/-/index.html.
75. See John Ngirachu, Uhuru and Ruto Strengthen Ties, DAILY NATION (Apr.
1, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+and+Ruto+strengthen
+ties+/-/ 1064/1137354/-/xr4ekyz/-/index.html; Benson Amadala, Alliance Mulls
Holding Presidential Nomination, DAILY NATION (June 18, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Alliance+mulls+holding+presidential+nomin
ation/-/1064/1184748/-/12nquuc/-/index.html.
76. See Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Ruto, Kosgey
and Sang, supra note 35; Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 35.
77. See KNDR DRAFT REvIEW, supra note 27, at 47; Makau Mutua, The
Group of Seven is a Tribal Alliance In All But Name, DAILY NATION (June 4, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/The+Group+of+Seven+is+a+tribal+alliance+
in+all+but+name/-/440808/1174840/-/13qaflh/-/index.html.
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seemed the only way to offer a credible alternative to Odinga's way to
State House.78
ii. Various Scenarios for the 2012 Elections
Though there have been a number of indications that the coalition
enjoys strong support, only six percent of the voters indicated their
support for the Kenyatta/Ruto combination in an April poll. 0
Furthermore, by June 2011, there were indications that the internal
cohesion in the alliance might not be as strong as it had initially
appeared.8' In the end, however, the success of the Ruto/Kenyatta
alliance-and any other presidential candidate for the 2012
elections-will to a large extent depend on the outcome of the ICC
process.
78. See Julius Sigei et al., Ruto, Uhuru Allies Train Their Guns on Raila,
DAILY NATION (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Ruto+
Uhuru+allies+train+their+guns+on+Raila+/-/1064/1137712/-/xtcsasz/-/index.html
(quoting Kenyatta as saying, "[t]hey were thinking that Mr Ruto [sic] and I will
begin fighting each other over the evidence, but they are wrong. We shall go to The
Hague and come back as solid as before"); Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All,
supra note 72.
79. See John Ngirachu & Oliver Musembi, Uhuru, Ruto Hold Last Rally
Ahead of Hague Visit, DAILY NATION (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/
News/politics/Uhuru+Ruto+hold+last+rally+ahead+of+Hague+visit// 1064/1138654/
-/4you41/-/index.html (noting that fifty MPs attended the last Ruto/Kenyatta rally
before they headed for The Hague); Jacob Ng'etich, Field Day for Ruto, Uhuru
Loyalists, DAILY NATION (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/
Field+day+for+Ruto+Uhuru+loyalists+/-/1 064/1141382/-/tnsqp5z/-/index.html
(noting that more than forty MPs joined the suspects to The Hague to show support).
80. See Oliver Mathenge, Raila-Mudavadi Tipped to Win in 2012, DAILY
NATION (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila+Mudavadi
+tipped+to+win+in+2012+/-/1064/1153932/-/vsvwasz/-/index.html. The most
popular combination for the 2012 election involves Odinga and Mudavadi, who
enjoy support by 20% of the voters, followed by a Kenyatta/Musyoka combination,
which is supported by 8% of the voters. Id. On their own, the April poll shows that
the most popular candidates for the 2012 presidential elections are: (1) Odinga
(38%); (2) Kenyatta (18%); (3) Musyoka (13%); (4) Ruto (8%); and (5) Karua (6%).
Id.
81. See, e.g., Julius Sigei, What Ails Uhuru-Ruto Union?, DAILY NATION
(June 4, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/What+ails+Uhuru+Ruto
+union//1064/1175062/-/item/0/-/wdjwhb/-/index.html (noting that land issues seem
to cause tensions in the alliance).
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There are three potential outcomes of the ICC process: (1)
Kenyatta and Ruto will not stand trial; (2) Kenyatta and Ruto are both
charged; or (3) charges are confirmed against either Kenyatta or Ruto,
but not the other. Should Pre-Trial Chamber II decide that Kenyatta
and Ruto will not stand trial, the two politicians would seem to stand
with strong cards against the other main competitors for the 2012
presidential elections, including Odinga. 82 Not only will they be able
to claim that their names have been cleared, but they will almost
certainly attempt to discredit Odinga for having pushed for ICC
trials. 83
On the contrary, should the Court decide to charge Ruto and
Kenyatta, both will face an uphill battle in gaining the presidency.
First, many commentators argue the new Constitution should be
understood to prohibit anyone charged with a serious crime from
running for president.84 Second, should Ruto and Kenyatta
nonetheless run for president, Odinga and the other presidential
candidates are likely to benefit, both because charges of crimes
against humanity can hardly be seen as an asset in an election
campaign and because the two suspects will be busy preparing their
defenses for trials in The Hague.85 Furthermore, if Ruto (Kalenjin)
and Kenyatta (Kikuyu) are out of the game, some speculate that the
Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups might not follow past voting
patterns, where members of each tribe have tended to vote almost
unanimously for a candidate from their own or affiliated tribe,
something which will likely benefit the other candidates, including
Odinga.86
82. See Samwel Kumba, September Set to Shape Future of Kenyan Politics,
DAILY NATION (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/September
+set+to+shape+future+of+Kenyan+politics+/-/1064/1145550/-/yplfjr/-/index.html.
83. See Mutiga, supra note 74.
84. See, e.g., id (citing Betty Murungi, an international law expert) (noting
that the new constitution and the Public Officer Ethics Act would not allow the two
to run for president if they are charged).
85. See Kumba, supra note 82.
86. See Kipchumba Some, Uhuru, Ruto Could Miss 2012 Polls, DAILY
NATION (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+Ruto+
could+miss+2012+polls+/-/l064/1123978/-/item/l/-/14qvf8hz/-/index.html. For
further discussion on the ethnic dimensions of Kenyan politics, see Fred Jonyo,
Ethnicity in Multi Party Politics, in ELECTORAL POLITICS IN KENYA 86-107 (Ludeki
Cheya ed., 2002).
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Should the court confirm charges against only one of the two
individuals, the person who is not charged would seem to pose a
serious challenge to Odinga and the other presidential candidates, as
he is likely to draw support from those who had intended to support
the person charged."
Yet, there are a number of uncertain factors, which might prove
determinative for the 2012 elections. For example, it is difficult to
predict how Vice President Musyoka will respond to the various
scenarios, and a leadership dispute between Ruto and Kenyatta
certainly cannot be excluded.88  Further, Kenyan politics are
unpredictable in that new alliances can be formed quickly, and new,
lesser-known politicians, may be "boosted" for the presidential post.
In March 2011, for example, Roads Minister, Franklin Bett, a Kalenjin
who has generally been seen as aligned with Odinga, indicated that he
will run for president. 89 Some consider Bett's move as an attempt to
position himself as an alternative for the Kalenjins, should Ruto be
charged. 90
C. How the ICC Process Impacts Peace and Security
Because tensions in the political leadership can spread to
communities, the impact of the ICC process on Kenyan politics is
closely related to the highly-contested question of how ICC
intervention affects peace and security in the country. Some-
including a number of government officials-argue that the pursuit of
accountability in the run-up to the 2012 election might trigger new
political violence. For example, a Kenyan ambassador rhetorically
asks: "[i]s a rush to undertake the pre-trial process in the political
climate of a presidential campaign worth the risk of destabilising the
country and a return to violence and loss of life in Kenya?" 91 In
contrast, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
87. See Mutiga, supra note 74.
88. Makau Mutua, Why a Fallout Between Ruto and Uhuru is Inevitable,
DAILY NATION (June 18, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Why+a+
fallout+between+Ruto+and+Uhuru+is+inevitable+/-/440808/1184970/-/11 ojv6hz/-
/index.html.
89. See, e.g., Some, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. Kamau Letter, supra note 48.
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academics involved with the issue argue that ICC trials will promote
peace and security in the country, not least since they will counter a
culture of impunity.92 Though somewhat tenuous, a number of
linkages between the ICC process and security in the country can be
identified.
i. Triggering or Limiting the Use ofHate Speech?
A first concern is that the political tensions described above have
been accompanied by "[a] tone for divisive ethno-political
mobilisation," resembling what has surrounded other instances of
political violence in the country. 93 There are plenty of examples of
such rhetoric. For example, Public Works Assistant Minister Mwangi
Kiunjuri, a vocal supporter of Kenyatta, has stated:
If we don't talk about Raila [Odinga] now, we shall be caught
unawares as a community . . . . Raila is not a good person. He is
like the animal that eats the chicken and its eggs . . . . A hyena is
hunted by a man and his in-law and a house that is divided is
destroyed by one stone .... A hyena hunts by following you in the
hope that your swinging hand will fall off. But we must get rid of
this hyena now . . .. Let me tell you, uncircumcised boys [making
reference to the Luo ethnic group to which Odinga belongs] are not
invited to dowry negotiations because, as you know, boys will
always take time to sing their play songs. An uncircumcised boy's
goings are only ended when he faces the knife.94
PNU Chief Whip Johnstone Muthama made statements of similar
gravity.95 Kenyatta and Ruto have also engaged in hard attacks on
92. See, e.g., Letter from Non-Governmental Organizations in Kenya to the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of African ICC States Parties on the UN Security
Council (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter NGO Letter to African ICC States], available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/ 03/02/gabonnigeriasouth-africa-reconsider-
support-deferral-icc-kenya-investigation.
93. See KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at vi.
94. John Ngirachu, Uhuru and Ruto Warned Over Hate Speech at Rallies,
DAILY NATION (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-
/1064/1137688/-/item/1/-/le2x0t/-/index.html.
95. Id.
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Odinga, though generally abstaining from the same level of ethnically-
divisive propaganda. 96
The use of statements like those cited here poses a serious risk for
the recurrence of political violence. Political commentator Onesmus
Murkommen explains: "[i]n Kenya certain leaders embody the ideals
of their respective communities and that is why they are kingpins
where they come from. Therefore, an attack on these individuals is
construed to be an attack on the larger community." 97 Some argue
that tensions in the political elite-and the potential for the elites to
mobilize masses through "hate speech"-present the biggest challenge
for peace and security in the country. 98
While the political climate has changed dramatically due to ICC
involvement, and ICC involvement seems to have triggered the use of
"hate speech," the ICC may at the same time remedy some of these
problems. First, though some politicians attempt to make the ICC
process look like an attack on whole communities, the hearings may
ultimately contribute to an understanding that it was individuals who
organized the violence to maintain or obtain power. It is interesting in
this regard that a recent survey reveals that more than fifty percent of
Kenyans expect community members to support ICC trials even if
they target leaders of their own ethnic group, while only four percent
predict such targeting could lead to a violent response. 99
Second, the Court has taken certain steps to limit the use of
divisive ethno-political rhetoric. During the April hearings, the
presiding judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II warned the suspects in
96. E.g., id. (quoting Kenyatta as calling Odinga a "kimundu" (a nuisance
bully) and stating, "[n]ow that Raila keeps describing some of us as drunkards, do
we go drinking with his wife? And now that he keeps telling us to go to The Hague,
is that Hague his mother's place? Is The Hague your mother's place for you to keep
singing about it?").
97. Kipchumba Some, Will this be Raila's Waterloo?, DAILY NATION (Apr.
16, 2011).
98. See KNDR DRAFT REvIEw, supra note 27, at v ("Sustaining the peace and
calm that was secured [in 2008] depends on only one major factor: how political
leaders reconcile their differences as the country moves towards the next General
Election, and specifically how they organise their politics for presidential contests.
National level political dynamics will influence local level issues; conflicts will
trickle to the local level and disrupt inter-ethnic relations. There is thus need to
manage national level political divisions to prevent a recurrence of violence.")
99. Id. at 17.
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general tones that any use of "dangerous speeches" could lead the
Chamber to issue arrest warrants on the suspects. 00 The warnings
issued seem to have had some impact on the nature of statements
subsequently made. For example, there was a notable change in the
language used during the "home-coming" rally, with Ruto stating,
"[w]e are prepared to carry this cross but our consolation is that never
again shall a Kenyan lose his life or property because of political
competition." 10
ii. Promoting or Hampering Kenya's Reform Agenda?
Another issue where the ICC process has a complex relationship
to peace and security concerns its impact on the reform agenda in
Kenya, which is recognized by many as crucial for preventing
political violence in the country.102 On the one hand, it seems as if the
recent, overwhelming focus on the ICC process has to some extent led
to neglect of the reform agenda. As the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities explains, "the personalisation and politicisation of the
ICC process had obscured dialogue on reforms that would prevent
future violence and the need to find justice for the victims, including
IDPs."l 03
On the other hand, there are also indications that ICC involvement
has caused politicians to pay increased attention to certain aspects of
the reform agenda. For example, Kenyan politicians have understood
that their prospects of succeeding with the admissibility challenge are
closely related to the reform agenda. This is well illustrated by a
statement made by Central Kenya MPs Association's Chairman,
Ephraim Maina:
100. See International Criminal Court, Ruto, Kosgey & Sang Case: Initial
Appearance, 7 April 2011, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/
IntlCriminalCourt#p/search/1/CQ09M8LeVJA.
101. See Peter Leftie, Uhuru and Ruto Vow to Preach Peace, DAILY NATION
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+and+Ruto+vow+to
+preach+peace+/-/1064/1142960/-/9tmj05z/-/index.html.
102. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, Will the New Constitution Lead to a
More Peaceful Kenya?, AFR. ARGUMENTS ONLINE (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://africanarguments.org/2010/08/will-the-new-constitution-lead-to-a-more-
peaceful-kenya/.
103. ICC Politics Hindrance to Reform, Says Annan, DAILY NATION (May 25,
2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1169078/-/7s68nl/-/index.html.
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We must now concentrate on enacting laws that will lead to
creation of a tenable judicial mechanism and ensure it is in place by
September when the Six return to The Hague. With this, the
country will be able to argue for a deferral and transfer of the case
home.104
Notable progress, seemingly related to this perceived linkage, includes
the recent approval of a new Chief Justice who is generally believed to
be a "pro-reformer."' Furthermore, after significant controversy,
Parliament has passed some crucial bills throughout 2011 to reform
the judiciary-actions which seem to have been promoted by a
perceived relationship between judicial reforms and the prospects of
succeeding with the admissibility challenge.10 6
iii. Will the ICC Process Deter Political Leaders from Utilizing
Violence as a Political Tool?
Finally, the ICC process might deter political leaders in the
country from using violence as a tool to maintain or obtain power.
Some argue that pursuing accountability runs counter to peace and
security because by targeting presidential candidates, the ICC. process
will push powerful individuals into a corner where, out of desperation,
they will be more disposed to incite and organize violence.'o 7 Though
such a scenario certainly cannot be excluded, it nonetheless seems
more likely that the accountability process will contribute to peace and
security in the country, at least in the long run. The ICC process
104. Njeri Rugene, MPs: ICC's Handling of Suspects Okay, DAILY NATION
(Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1140986/-/7qr43d/-
/index.html.
105. See Mutunga, Baraza and Tobiko Get House Nod, DAILY NATION (June
15, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Mutunga+Baraza+and+
Tobiko+get+House+nod++/-/1 064/1181740/-/15qvdh5/-/index.html.
106. For an overview of the bills passed, see Alphonce Shiundu, MPs Work
Overtime to Pass Crucial Bills, DAILY NATION (June 1, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1 064/1172996/-/7sn4fj/-/index.html.
107. See, e.g., Kamau Letter, supra note 48 ("Some of the individuals
mentioned by the ICC prosecutor are among the front runner presidential candidates
and the civil servants mentioned are in office and charged with responsibilities for
peace and security. Needless to say, therefore, the pending ICC indictments pose a
real and present danger to the exercise of government and the management of peace
and security in the country.").
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presents an important step forward in ending Kenya's legacy of
impunity, which has been a prerequisite for political violence. The
potential trial of six powerful Kenyans is likely to make political
leaders think twice before ordering violent attacks on their opponents
in the future.o 8 While the deterrent effect of the ICC as such is
disputed,' 09 in the specific case of Kenya, where members of the
political elites have for decades incited large-scale violence with
impunity, there seems thus to be some merit in claiming that the
Court's actions might deter other political leaders from using violence
as a political tool in the future.' 10 Interestingly, a recently published
study reveals that ordinary Kenyans view prosecuting the people
responsible for political violence as the single-most important way of
preventing new violence."
The court hearings might also indirectly contribute to ending a
practice of using violence for political purposes, as they seem to limit
108. See, e.g., NGO Letter to African ICC States, supra note 92.
109. For a discussion of the role international tribunals can play for deterring
large-scale violence, see MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169-73 (2007) (arguing that international courts face a number
of serious obstacles deterring potential war criminals and perpetrators of other
international crimes). See also Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary
Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs.
J. 39, 63-71 (2002) (expressing doubts as to the effectiveness of criminal justice as a
deterrent); Margaret M. DeGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at
the International Criminal Court, MICH. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--1780446 (assuming that deterrence "provides a partial
justification for the ICC's work," but emphasizing that deterrence theory also fails to
provide an "adequate basis for making selection decisions at the Court"); David
Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 473 (1999) (arguing that international courts have a limited
deterrent effect); Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment: Progress in International
Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 462 (1999) (arguing that consistent
prosecution of state leaders may have some deterrent effect).
110. CIPEV, supra note 14, at 22 ("Over time, this deliberate use of violence
by politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish
perpetrators has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of violence.").
See also Impact of the Rome Statute, supra note 9; Asaala, supra note 6, at 390-95.
111. KNDR DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 27, at 25 (finding that the five most
important measures for preventing new violence are seen by Kenyans as: (1)
"[p]rosecute those responsible for violence" (21%); (2) "promote peace and
reconciliation" (18%); (3) "fight tribalism (17%); (4) "free and fair elections (12 %);
and (5) "politicians stop incitement" (8 %)).
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the perception that Kenya's political elite are untouchable. For
example, during the April hearings in The Hague, Presiding Judge
Ekaterina Trendafilova ordered Ruto to sit down and be quiet when he
claimed the charges brought against him "can only be possible in a
movie."1l 2 This clear signal sent by the judge that the Court will not
allow any manipulation of the hearings seemed to surprise Ruto, a
politician who is generally viewed by Kenyans as beyond the reach of
the law."' Importantly, the incident received significant attention in
Kenyan media, with one commentator sarcastically noting that "[i]t
took the eloquence of Eldoret North MP William Ruto to make the
point that everybody has been getting unnecessarily excited over a
movie-a work of art, the fictive imaginings of a fertile mind."' 1 4
D. Toward Transition with the ICC?
The ICC process has had-and will in all probability continue to
have in the near future-a significant impact on politics and security
in Kenya. Yet, while ICC intervention has clearly impacted Kenyan
politics in fundamental ways, the developments taking place should
often be seen as triggered, rather than caused by the ICC. As noted
by Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs, Mr. Ababu Namwamba, "[the ICC dispute] is a tiny piece of
the iceberg. The real prize is succession and control over the shaping
of the Second Republic."" 5  While it remains uncertain who will
112. See International Criminal Court, Ruto, Kosgey & Sang Case: Initial
Appearance, 7 April 2011, supra note 100.
113. In April 2011, for example, Ruto was acquitted in a grant corruption case
due to the absence of witnesses who could testify against him. The witnesses had
either died or were unwilling to testify, often because they had subsequently been
employed by Ruto. See Fraud Case: Ruto Gave Job to Key Potential Witnesses,
DAILY NATION (Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Fraud+case
+Ruto+gave+job+to+key+potential+witness+/-/1064/1145926/-/t8qmt6z/-
/index.html.
114. See Kwamchetsi Makokha, Op-Ed., Yes, Kenya's Post-Election Violence
Was Just a Harmless Horror Movie, DAILY NATION (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Yes+post+poll+chaos+was+just+movie+/-
/440808/1141222/-/2uheoh/-/index.html.
115. Mugumo Munene, Power Politics Behind Kibaki-Raila Standoff DAILY
NATION (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Power+politics
+behind+Kibaki+Raila+standoff+/-/1064/1111064/-/119sqsmz/-/index.html.
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eventually benefit politically from the accountability process, it also
remains uncertain whether the ICC process will promote profound
political transition. However, profiling the main candidates may cast
some light on the prospects for fundamental political change.
Kenyatta and Ruto, who were associated with the Moi regime (the
authoritarian leader that ruled Kenya from 1978-2002), are generally
seen as conservative powers who work on the premises of tribal
politics and are unlikely to promote fundamental reforms of the
system of governance.1" 6
Musyoka, an experienced politician with roots in Moi's
dictatorship, is also seen by most as a pragmatic politician who is
opposed to fundamental changes." 7
Odinga, who was detained as a political prisoner during Moi's
dictatorship, is generally understood to be relatively supportive of the
reform agenda. But Odinga is also seen as pragmatic, and the extent
to which he will be able to reform the system of governance is likely
to depend on a number of other factors, including who he allies with
for the 2012 elections." 8
Karua, a dedicated women's rights activist, is generally accepted
to be an outspoken pro-reformer. While she is arguably the only
major presidential candidate who shows some reluctance toward
working on the premises of tribal politics, she might be forced to enter
an alliance which would make it harder, but not impossible, to
promote profound transition. 19 Put simply, should the ICC choose to
116. See Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, supra note 72; Willy
Mutunga, The Unfolding Political Alliances and their Implications for Kenya's
Transition, in BUILDING AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN
KENYA, supra note 20, at 60; David Kariuki, Guest Column: Casting Uhuru
Kenyatta's Profile into Perspective, KENYA STOCKHOLM BLOG (June 2, 2011),
http://kenyastockholm.com/2011/06/02/guest-column-casting-uhuru-kenyattas-
profile-into-perspective/.
117. See Joe Khamisi, How Kalonzo and Uhuru Plotted to Stop Raila, DAILY
NATION (Apr. 23, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/How+Kalonzo
+and+Uhuru+plotted+to+stop+Raila+/-/1064/1149826/-/ie2eu3z/-/index.html;
Mutunga, supra note 116.
118. See Raila, Ruto Clash Not Surprising at All, supra note 72; Mutunga,
supra note 116; Noel Mwakugu, Odinga: Kenya's King-Maker, BBC NEWS (Apr.
17, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7068055.stm.
119. See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Op-Ed., Five Reasons Martha Karua Could Win
the Presidency, DAILY NATION (May 7, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/
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charge Ruto and Kenyatta, presidential candidates who are more
disposed to transforming the system of governance would likely
benefit.
Beyond the impact on succession politics, the ICC process may
also promote transition in Kenya in other ways. In particular, the
accountability process offers hope that political leaders will be more
reluctant to use violence as a political tool in the future, thus
potentially leading the way to peaceful transformation. Yet, other
measures such as implementing the new constitution and combating
so-called political tribalism are also needed to bring about a profound
transition.12 While ICC involvement in the short-term might prove
an obstacle for ensuring that sufficient attention is paid to such
measures, the reform process ultimately has little value if not followed
by a "culture of accountability." Overall, the ICC process should thus
be viewed as something positive for promoting peaceful transition in
Kenya.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the complicated process of pursuing
accountability for the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, and how
the accountability process impacts domestic politics and security.
While significant obstacles to a meaningful transition lie ahead, the
absence of a regime change should not be viewed as a factor that per se
renders it impossible to commence an accountability process that might
ultimately promote political and peaceful transition. The Kenyan case
sets itself apart from most other cases of transitional justice in that
there has been a partial, though extremely shifting, commitment to
pursuing accountability in a scenario where those who allegedly
sponsored large-scale violence still form part of the country's
leadership. Although this commitment has not materialized into the
establishment of a local accountability process-and crucial parts of
the leadership strongly oppose ICC involvement in the country-the
accountability process is nonetheless ongoing, and there are signs that
Opinion/Five+reasons+Martha+Karua+could+win+the+presidency+/440808/11580
38/-/gx3dll/-/index.html.
120. Thomas Obel Hansen, The Kenya Transitional Justice Brief vol. 1, no. 2,
August 2011, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., (Sept. 2011),
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-KEN-Transitional-Justice-Brief-2-2011 .pdf.
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it is more likely to promote progressive transformation than not. It
therefore also makes some sense to speak of "transitional justice" in
Kenya-if understood as a potential driver of transition, rather than
something that is preconditioned on an already existing transition.
AFTERWORD
On January 23, 2012-after this article had been completed and
prepared for publication-Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC made the
much-awaited decision on the charges brought by the Prosecutor with
regard to Kenya's post-election violence. The majority of judges
found substantial grounds to believe that four of the six suspects
committed the crimes alleged by the Prosecutor.' 2 1 In the PNU case,
the Chamber concluded that "there is sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta are
individually criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators" for
murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape,
persecution, and other inhumane acts, all constituting crimes against
humanity under the Rome Statute.122 The evidence presented, the
Chamber noted, supports the Prosecutor's allegations of close links
between Kenyatta and Muthaura and the Mungiki gang. 12 In the
ODM case, the Chamber found sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that Ruto is criminally responsible as an
indirect co-perpetrator and Sang for contributing to the crimes of
murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and
persecution, amounting to crimes against humanity.124 Assessing the
121. Judge Hans-Peter Kaul dissented for the same reason that he dissented to
the prior decisions, namely on the ground that the policy requirement in crimes
against humanity is seen not to be satisfied.
122. Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v.
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali,
Case No. ICC-01/09-02/1 1, Public Redacted Version, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 428 (Jan. 23,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl314543.pdf [hereinafter Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges - Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali].
123. See id. M 301-308.
124. Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v.
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No.
ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 299 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-
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evidence presented, the Chamber found reasons to believe that Ruto
played a crucial role organizing the attacks on PNU supporters,
including adopting a "stipendiary scheme and a rewarding mechanism
to motivate the perpetrators to kill and displace the largest number of
persons belonging to the targeted communities as well as to destroy
their properties." 2 5 The Chamber dismissed the defense team's claim
that any alleged misconduct of the Prosecutor has a bearing on the
confirmation of charges.1 26
Unless the Appeals Chamber reverses the decisions, Kenyatta,
Muthaura, Ruto, and Sang will thus stand trial in the near future, while
Kosgey and Ali are no longer suspected by the Court. The suspects
committed for trial all immediately indicated their intent to appeal the
Chamber's ruling, with Ruto and Kenyatta further emphasizing that
their run for the presidency remains unaffected by the prospects of
international trials.127 While the Prosecutor has publically stated that
he will not appeal the Court's decision concerning Kosgey and Ali, at
the same time he noted that he will "keep investigating Kosgey and
the activities of the police as well as crimes allegedly committed in
Kibera and Kisumu."l 28
It remains unclear at present exactly how the government will
react to the Court's ruling. However, in a speech delivered on the day
of the ruling, President Kibaki implied that the government views its
own (partly reformed) judiciary as capable of dealing with the post-
election violence cases. 129 Subsequently, the Attorney-General stated
he will consult the newly appointed Chief Justice, noting that "[w]e in
cpi.int/iccdocs/ doc/docl314535.pdf [hereinafter Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges - Ruto, Kosgey & Sang].
125. Id. 303.
126. See Decision on the Confirmation of Charges - Muthaura, Kenyatta &
Ali, supra note 122, 63-65; Decision on the Confirmation of Charges - Ruto,
Kosgey & Sang, supra note 124, 49-53.
127. See Xinhua, Kenyan Suspects to Appeal Against ICC Ruling, DAILY
NATION (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenyan
+suspects+to+appeal+ against+ICC+ruling/-/1064/1312660/-/mth9mlz/-lindex.html.
128. Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on Kenya
Ruling (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/54E6388D-4DDO-4E85-
8FA9-90DA95A2AFB3.htm.
129. See Kibaki Orders Githu to Set Up Legal Team on Ruling, DAILY NATION
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kibaki+orders+Githu+to
+set+up+legal+team+on+ruling+/-/1 064/1312780/-/13okgghz/-/index.html.
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government are confident that under the stewardship of Chief Justice
Willy Mutunga, the Judiciary is robust and capable of undertaking this
challenge."l 30 The Attorney-General further stated that that the two
members of the government-Finance Minister Kenyatta and Head of
Public Service Muthaura-will remain in office. As the Court has
already dismissed Kenya's admissibility challenge, this could be seen
as a policy statement indicating potential non-cooperation with the
ICC. It is thus unclear whether the government ultimately intends to
respect the Court's claim of jurisdiction, including potentially handing
over the suspects to the ICC should they fail to appear voluntarily.
Understanding the motives for such opposition, it is necessary to take
into account that the trial of Muthaura and Kenyatta may implicate the
President directly in the violence. Notably, the Pre-Trial Chamber's
finding that there are substantial grounds to believe that several
meetings were held at Nairobi State House between "Mr. Muthaura,
Mr. Kenyatta, Mungiki representatives, President Mwai Kibaki, and
others" raises the question of how the President could attend such
meetings without having endorsed, or at least been familiar with, the
plans of attacking ODM supporters.132
Keeping in mind that Odinga and other prominent ODM party
members will likely push hard for the commencement of the ICC
trials, tensions between the coalition partners may escalate in the
coming months, possibly leading to the complete breakdown of the
coalition government. In this event, the election date could be pushed
forward from the March 2013 date recently ruled the deadline by a
Kenyan court.133  In sum, the political landscape in Kenya will
continue to be dramatically affected by the ICC cases, likely
increasing already existing tensions. While there is a danger that
some politicians may attempt to mobilize masses in an effort to avoid
ICC prosecutions and gain power, it is also worth noting that there
130. John Ngirachu, Uhuru, Muthaura Can Remain in Office, AG, DAILY
NATION (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Uhuru+
Muthaura+can+remain+in+office+AG+/-/1064/1313300/-/llgcupgz/-/index.html.
13 1. Id.
132. See, e.g., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges - Muthaura, Kenyatta
& Ali, supra note 122, 310-332 (regarding meeting on Nov. 26, 2007).
133. Court: Kenya Set for 2013 Poll Unless Coalition Dissolved, DAILY
NATION (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kenya+set+for+
2 0 13 +poll +unless+coalition+dissolved/-/1064/1304976/-/12wigpq/-/index.html.
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were no immediate violent responses to the ICC ruling and that most
ordinary Kenyans continue to support the Court's intervention. 134
134. See Tom Maliti, Polls: Support for ICC Remains High, But Fear of
Violence Has Increased, KENYA MONITOR (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.icckenya.org/2012/01/polls-support-for-icc-remains-high-but-fear-of-
violence-has-increased/.
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